however, may be a key obstacle preventing such a convergence. The business-as-usual (BAU) growth path of the world economy might increase concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse gases to unsafe levels and cause significant negative environmental feedback before China achieves parity in living standards with the OECD countries. We use a dynamic multi-country general equilibrium model (the G-Cubed Model) to project a realistic BAU trajectory of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, and we fi nd it to be even above the CO2 emissions from the high-growth scenario estimated by the Energy Information Agency in 2007.
This outcome is a reminder that it has been usual so far to underestimate the growth in China energy consumption.
We compare the merits of the different market-based This projected parity in living standards in the longrun would represent a return to the world economic situation that persisted in the fi rst 1,600 years of the Gregorian calendar (see Table 1 ). In year 0, China and Century, however, is not that conflict is inevitable but that rising powers and existing powers should work hard together to avoid past mistakes; to falsify Karl Marx's quip that "history repeats itself, fi rst as tragedy, second as farce." It is not naive to think that confl ict is preventable because the most important power to rise and prevail in the 20th century was the United States and it has, in general, been a stabilizing force in the international order. Averting the pessimistic outcome requires adherence to the multi-lateralist principle of the existing powers accommodating rising powers, and the latter becoming responsible stakeholders in the international system.
The dialogue between the existing and rising powers must necessarily be comprehensive because the range of global public goods that must be supplied is broad (ranging from the maintenance of the Universal Postal System to the peaceful use of outer space), and the nature of some of these global public goods are highly complicated (e.g. a scheme to control the emission of greenhouse gases). In this paper, we will confi ne discussion to an economic issue where the need to engage China in constructive dialogue is important Data for 0 to 1998 are from Maddison (2001); and for 2003 are from Maddison (2007) Garnaut, et al., (2008) .
However, the Kaya Identity is a useful historical decomposition but it is not an ideal forecasting framework.
Each of its components is actually an endogenous outcome resulting from a wide variety of individual decisions, and cannot be assumed to remain constant in the future. As shown by Bagnoli, McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1996) 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 percent per year 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 There is still much about the science of climate change that we do not fully understand. Is climate change a linear or an abrupt discontinuous function of CO2 concentration? 13 Is there are saturation point in the absorptive capacity of the Earth's sinks for atmospheric CO2?
There are immense difficulties in computing the costs and benefi ts of climate change. How should we value irreversible events like species extinction?
How should we value the benefi ts to the present generation and the costs to the not-yet-born future generations?
There are serious challenges to designing effective implementation and oversight mechanisms for the CO2 reduction process. How can national CO2 caps be enforced? How can we build in incentives for mutual policing among the polluters dispersed round the world?
The reduction of CO2 emissions would only delay, not stop, the increase in CO2 concentrations toward the "danger level." The only long-term solution is likely to be shifting to non-fossil energy. It is, however, impossible to know when this alternative fuel would be available at commercially viable costs, and at the vast scales that will ultimately be required. If the CO2 reduction mechanism is designed to buy time for this development, how long will we need?
There is unlikely to be an amicable way to distribute the burden of reducing CO2. Should the existing polluters be "grandfathered" into the international treaty? What should be the relative bur- 
The domestic carbon tax
A carbon tax could be applied at the domestic level as well. Given a time profi le of desired CO2 emissions for a country, it would be possible to identify the carbon tax required to achieve it. However, this approach is likely to be ineffi cient in the global sense because it would not guarantee that the marginal cost of emissions reductions would be the same across countries. The probable outcome would be a distortion of comparative advantage. Again, developing countries might be exempted temporarily from having to impose this domestic carbon tax.
Domestic cap-and-trade
A country could issue emissions permits to match a national target emissions path. The permits could be given free to existing CO2 emitters or auctioned to the general public, and would be tradable within the country but not across borders. This approach, like the domestic carbon tax, is unlikely to produce a globally effi cient pattern of abatement. The developing countries might be given ceilings on CO2 emissions that are binding only when they attain a particular income level. Every year, fi rms would be required to hold a portfolio of permits equal to the amount of carbon they emit.
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The portfolio could include any mix of long-term and annual permits. The long-term permits could be owned outright by fi rms, or they could be leased from other permit owners. Except for the case of developing countries, which we will discuss in detail later, the amount of long-term permits for each country would be intentionally set lower than the anticipated amount of emissions (e.g. set below the target emissions path). If the target turns out to be suffi ciently tight, there will be demand for the annual permits, which will impose an internationally-fi xed upper bound on the short term price of carbon emissions.
Each country would manage its own domestic hybrid policy using its own existing legal system and fi nan- 
Long term permits
A 100-year permit would be akin to a book of 100 cou- Incumbent fi rms would benefi t fi nancially from the initial distribution of permits, but unless they were previously liquidity-constrained, they would not be able to use their gains to reduce competition.
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Another alternative would be to auction the permits.
Auctioned permits would be exactly like a carbon tax except that the industry would have to pay the entire present value of all future carbon taxes up front. As the number of long-term permits was intentionally kept below the target path of emissions, at least a few annual permits would be sold in every year. The price of a permit during the auction would be bid up to the present value of a sequence of annual permit purchases.
Annual permits
The government would sell annual permits for an 
Treatment of developing countries
To be effective in the long run, the agreement will eventually need to include all countries with significant greenhouse gas emissions. However, it is unlikely 
Incentives for investments in CO2 reduction under MWH
The MWH mechanism is argued by some to be more complex than an emissions tax or conventional permit system but it is more likely to encourage private sector investments in capital and research that will be needed to address climate change. To see why, consider the incentives faced by a fi rm after the policy has been established. Suppose it has the opportunity to invest in a new production process that would re- At that point, any investments made by a fi rm to re-duce its emissions would no longer earn a return. The effect of uncertainty about the policy's prospects is thus to make the investments it seeks to encourage substantially more risky.
Since the incentives created by the policy increase with the price of an annual permit, a government might try to compensate for low credibility by imposing higher annual fees. For example, suppose a government would like a climate policy to generate a $400 incentive for investment but firms believe that there is a 10 percent chance the policy will be abandoned each year. For the policy to generate the desired incentive, the annual permit price would have to be $60 rather than $20. That is, the stringency of the policy (as measured by the annual permit fee) must triple in order to offset the two-thirds decline the incentives arising from the policy's lack of credibility. In practice, the situation is probably even worse.
Increasing the policy's stringency is likely to reduce its credibility further, requiring even larger increases in the annual fee. For example, suppose that investors believe that the probability the government will abandon the policy rises by 1 percent for each $20 increase in the annual fee. In that case, maintaining a $400 investment incentive would require an annual fee of $70 rather than $60, which would be accompanied by an increase in the perceived likelihood of the policy being abandoned from 10 percent to 12.5 percent.
The general lesson is that a low-cost but highly certain policy generates the same incentives for action as a policy that is much more expensive but less certain. A hybrid policy with a modest annual permit price would generate larger investment incentives than a more draconian, but less credible, emissions target imposed by a more conventional system of targets and timetables. The MWH proposal is more credible than a carbon tax because it builds a political constituency with a large fi nancial stake in preventing backsliding by future governments. It is, thus, likely to provide more incentive to the private sector to make investments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Coping with new information
Over time, more information will become available about climate change, its effects, and about the costs of reducing emissions. If it becomes clear that emissions should be reduced more aggressively, the price of annual permits can be raised. The political prospects for an increase would be helped by the fact that raising the price of annual permits would produce a windfall gain for owners of long-term permits, since the market value of long-term permit prices would rise as well.
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If new information indicates that emissions should drop below the number allowed by long-term permits, raising the price of annual permits would need to be augmented by a reduction in the stock of long-term permits. One option would be for each government to buy and retire some of the long-term permits it issued. Other approaches would be possible as well:
for example, accelerating the expiration date of the permits. 
COMPARING METHODS FOR REDUCING CHINA'S CO2 EMISSIONS

Advanced technology diffusion
Another policy approach, which is often advocated Table 3 . The values shown include both effects mentioned above: improvements in the efficiency of fossil fuel combustion, and shifts in the fuel mix away from fossil fuels. By 2030, for example, the 1.66 shown for Japan indicates that advanced technology and fuel-switching will mean that the ratio of total electricity produced to fossil fuel input will be 1.66
times that ratio today. We assume that technology and fuel switching continue beyond 2030, although at a diminishing rate. By 2045, for example, the augmentation factor for Japan increases to 2.09. The augmentation factors vary considerably by country.
Improvements are very limited in LDCs other than In order to track the macro time series, the behavior of agents is modifi ed to allow for short run deviations from optimal behavior either due to myopia or to restrictions on the ability of households and fi rms to borrow at the risk free bond rate on government debt. Although it is assumed that market forces eventually drive the world economy to a neoclassical steady state growth equilibrium, unemployment does emerge for long periods due to wage stickiness, to an extent that differs between countries due to differences in labor market institutions. around the globe." (IPPC, 2007, pp.13-14) Kirby (2004) . The tipping point is defi ned as when 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8. the melting of the Greenland ice cap becomes irreversible. Beer (2007) . Raupach is quoted as saying:
" ... if we manage to bring CO2 to equilibrium at 450ppm, we would be looking at a temperature rise of 1 to 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels, some changes to rainfall patterns, some melting of the Arctic, signifi cant acidifi cation of the oceans through CO2 rise and so forth. But these are issues which would not cause widespread devastation .... If we reach 550ppm, we're getting into 2 to 2.5 degree temperature rise and the amount of climate damage that we would be looking at will in some cases would probably involve crossing thresholds that we can't recover from. See Kaya (1990) See McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1998) and documentation at http://www.gcubed.com Gulledge (2008, pp.52 ) has described the proposition that "future climate change will be smooth and gradual" as a myth: "The history of climate reveals that climate change occurs in fi ts and starts, with abrupt and sometimes dramatic changes rather than gradually over time." Figure   3 Gulledge (2008, pp.56) pointed out that "the models used to project future warnings either omit or do not account for uncertainty in potentially positive feedbacks that could amplify warming (for example, release of greenhouse gases from thawing permafrost, reduced ocean and ter-9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
restrial CO2 removal from the atmosphere), and there is some evidence that such feedbacks may already be occurring in response to the present warming trend." Table 2 This approach is known as a downstream policy because it applies to fuel users. It would also be possible to apply the policy upstream by imposing limits on the carbon embodied in fuels when they are produced (e.g., at the mine mouth or wellhead).
The negotiations, of course, would not be trivial:
getting agreement on the annual price would require considerable diplomacy. It is interesting to note that a treaty of this form has a strong built-in incentive for countries to participate in the initial negotiations. Countries that participate will have a role in setting the annual price while those who remain on the sidelines will not. We are indebted to Jonathan Pershing for pointing this out.
Countries have different degrees of concern about climate change and different abilities to implement climate policies. A coordinated system of hybrid policies provides participants with the ability to tailor the policy to their own circumstances.
A government might prefer a carbon tax if it lacks the institutional and administrative mechanisms needed to operate a permit market.
In passing, it's worth noting that anti-competitive behavior by the incumbents, while unlikely, would 15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
have an environmental benefi t: it would reduce overall carbon emissions.
In contrast, a conventional international permit system could be particularly diffi cult to enforce because of the links it creates between countries.
Restricting sales of permits by non-complying countries, as would be required under the Kyoto Protocol, would harm the interests of compliant countries by raising permit prices. The international links between permit markets thus provide a strong incentive against enforcement of the agreement.
Although long term permit owners would welcome an increase in the annual price, there is little risk that they would be able to drive prices up on their own. Given that other energy users provide countervailing pressure to keep energy prices low, it is hard to imagine that permit owners would be able to push a government into adopting an inefficiently high price and excessively stringent emissions policy.
The exact details of the target are not central to this paper because we will be comparing alternative policies for reaching a single set of targets.
However more rapid cuts in emissions would clearly give different results to those presented here.
The excessive amount of long-term permits in the fi rst few years of the this policy option means that the global emissions of CO2 in the third policy option exceeds the amount of global CO2 emission in the fi rst and second policy option (whose emission equals each other's). It is interesting that if China were given an excessive amount of carbon credits in the second policy option, its emissions path and GDP path would still be the same as shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8 as long as the extra amount of carbon credits given to China is small and hence has no effect on the world price of carbon credits. As production in China is guid- See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) .
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